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Introduction
From the early to the mid-2010s, the political 
upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
to Europe. As part of its reaction, the EU (European 
Union) proposed in September 2015 a Europe-wide 
refugee-sharing scheme in an attempt to relocate to 
other EU states the asylum-seekers concentrated in 
Greece and Italy. Many states agreed on the scheme, 
but others were unenthusiastic or even hostile to it. 
??????????? ???? ??????????? ???????????? ???????????
majority vote; while many states voted for it, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia 
voted against. Even after the adoption of the scheme, 
Hungary and Slovakia continued to oppose it by 
calling, albeit without success, for the decision to be 
annulled by the Court of Justice of the EU. 
One question which is worth investigating is 
what factors made national governments willing 
Abstract
When negotiating a refugee-sharing scheme in 2015, 
some EU (European Union) member states supported 
it but others opposed it. Which factors encouraged 
or discouraged the member states to support the 
refugee-sharing scheme? Our aim in this paper is to 
statistically test a wide range of possible factors, each 
of which is related to 1) party politics; 2) institutional 
capacity; 3) socio-ethnic composition; 4) labor market 
conditions; 5) social norms; and 6) security concerns. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
politics, the institutional capacity and the socio-ethnic 
????????????? ???? ?????????????? ??????????? ??????? ???
the government support for or opposition to the EU’s 
refugee-sharing scheme.
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or unwilling to share refugees? We can point out a 
wide range of domestic factors which are presumably 
involved in the decision-making of national 
governments to support or oppose a refugee-sharing 
scheme: 1) party politics; 2) institutional capacity; 3) 
socio-ethnic composition; 4) labor market conditions; 
5) social norms; and 6) security concerns. The 
purpose of this article is to analyze which of the above 
were relevant to the formation of national positions, 
with an empirical focus on the EU’s refugee-
sharing decisions. Looking at the various positions 
taken by the member states, we statistically test the 
various factors against each other. This empirical 
investigation makes a normatively and practically 
important contribution by illuminating the conditions 
that are needed to encourage states to foster solidarity 
by opening an opportunity of protection to as many 
actual refugees as possible.
???? ????????????? ??????????? ????????? ????? ??????
factors relevant to the shaping of the national 
?????????? ?????? ??????????? ???????????? ??????? ???
hesitate to support the scheme at a time when they 
were competing against other rightist parties not in 
government, especially radical right-wing parties; 
second, states which have only limited experience of 
protecting refugees and capacity for doing so became 
less willing to support schemes for sharing refugees; 
third, any state with a low Muslim population also 
tended to be unwilling to embark on such schemes.
This article proceeds as follows. To start with, we 
review the literature on refugee-sharing and formulate 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
positions vis-à-vis refugee-sharing. Next, we provide 
a brief empirical background for the EU’s decision to 
relocate refugees. Then, after presenting our research 
design, we show the results of the statistical analysis. 
?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
feasibility of refugee-sharing across states.
1. How is solidarity in refugee-sharing created?
In a refugee crisis, it is necessary to give protection 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
countries of origin to other countries. But when great 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
few countries, the burdens on these countries exceed 
the limits of their capacity, leading to disastrous 
situations in which many asylum-seekers cannot get 
access to adequate protection and assistance. In such 
crises, states are expected to stand together to share 
asylum-seekers (Thieleman 2003a). Admittedly, 
some asylum-seekers will not want to be relocated to 
another state. In practice, however, refugee-sharing 
schemes are desperately needed, since to share 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and at the same time alleviates the burden on countries 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
is the case in particular when the root causes of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
persecutions cannot for the time be resolved and it is 
not desirable to repatriate those who have left their 
countries (Schuck 1997: 260-1).
Despite such desirability, it is widely recognized 
in the literature on refugee burden-sharing that states 
all too often become unenthusiastic or even hostile 
at the prospect of any refugee-sharing scheme, apart 
from the states that expect the scheme will lighten 
their burden of accepting refugees (Noll 2000: 
273-5; Suhrke 1998). This is not surprising, since 
various costs and perceived risks accrue to the states 
receiving refugees, ranging from the administrative 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
social tensions, the political risk of anti-refugee 
forces gaining popularity, and the perceived security 
concerns (Huysmans 2000; Waever et al 1993).
Given these risks and costs, states become prone 
to close their borders and keep refugees out of their 
territories, without participating in international 
refugee-sharing schemes. Furthermore, in the context 
of the European Union where people can in principle 
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move freely within internal borders, it becomes 
possible for secondary movements into other states to 
ensue if some states admit large numbers of refugees. 
Mindful of this possibility, some EU states expect the 
EU to function as a “Fortress Europe”, calling for 
other states, in particular those with external borders, 
to tighten their border controls and deny large-scale 
entry into their countries (Noll 1997: 428).
?????? ????????????????? ? ???????????????? ??????????
considered possible ways to make states cooperate 
with each other when refugees are relocated. One of 
the mechanisms, which often appear in the literature, 
is explicit or implicit issue-linkage (Betts 2009). In 
this view, states can positively cooperate with other 
states in sharing refugees when they expect to gain 
??????? ????????? ???????? ??? ?????? ???????????? ?????
doing so, which will outweigh the costs of receiving 
?????????? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ?????????? ?????????
???????????? ?????? ???????? ??? ????????? ????????????
Another view of the search for cooperation focuses 
on an “insurance logic”. According to this view, states 
are led to participate in refugee-sharing schemes, 
when they foresee the risk that they may also be faced 
????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ??? ?????? ????? ??????? ?????
them (Schuck 1997: 249-250, 273). A trading system 
of refugee quotas has also been proposed in the 
literature, which allows the states that are reluctant to 
receive refugees to pay money to other states which 
can accept more refugees on their behalf (Schuck 
1997). Furthermore, some studies draw attention to 
the division of labor in which many states cooperate 
to solve a refugee crisis by allocating various tasks 
??? ????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????????????
such as military or humanitarian intervention, 
????????? ???????????? ?????????? ????????? ??????? ??????
Thielemann & Dewan 2006).
What all these studies have in common is their 
underlying assumption that national governments 
have a reluctant preference to protect refugees. 
Starting from this assumption, those studies set 
out possible ways or mechanisms for the states to 
overcome their reluctance and attain a substantial 
level of refugee-sharing. Due to this assumption, 
however, these studies overlook one important point. 
This is that some countries, even without linking any 
other issues, the logic of insurance, the trading system, 
or the division of labor, can agree to participate in a 
relocation scheme and under it, to receive refugees. 
One such case is found in the European Union, 
which decided to set up a relocation scheme in 2015; 
many states agreed to it and only a few opposed it. It 
seems that, in the literature on burden-sharing, which 
concentrated on the mechanisms that can overcome 
national reluctance, it is less clear what factors are 
likely to encourage states to accept and support a 
refugee-sharing scheme and which discourage them. 
Given such uncertainty in the literature, this article 
aims to examine several possible domestic factors 
that might encourage national governments to support 
a refugee-sharing scheme.
2. Hypotheses
Although the burden-sharing literature generally tells 
little about the sources of a nation’s position on refugee-
sharing, we can envisage a wide array of possible 
factors which might encourage national governments 
to approach refugee-sharing positively, drawing upon 
a broad spectrum of theoretical reasoning, empirical 
insights, and practical proposals that current studies 
or reports in various disciplines have presented. Here 
we sort them out into six categories of hypothesis, 
focusing in turn on party politics, institutional 
capacity, socio-ethnic composition, labor market 
conditions, social norms and security concerns.
2.1. Party politics
The ideologies and related electoral strategies of the 
???????? ??? ????? ???? ?????? ???? ??????? ??? ?????????
governments to support or oppose an international 
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scheme of refugee-sharing. Generally it is right-wing 
parties that view immigration and refugee issues in a 
negative light (Alonso & da Fonseca 2012). That is, 
in line with their conservative or nationalistic beliefs, 
rightist parties usually take a tough stance on foreign-
origin immigrants and refugees within their societies, 
seeing them as unwanted others who they suspect may 
disturb their traditional values and lifestyles. With 
a view to elections, they also strategically consider 
that their tough stance on immigrants can win many 
votes from those with conservative or ethno-centric 
values. Leftist parties, for their part, traditionally tend 
to be immigrant-friendly, with their social democratic 
traditions favoring the disadvantaged or the weak. 
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
that:
H1a: When rightist parties are in government, 
these governments are likely to oppose an 
international refugee-sharing scheme.
The above discussion focuses on the impact of the 
partisan element of government. Let us now turn to 
???? ????????? ????????? ??? ???? ????????????? ?????????
??? ???????? ??????????? ????????? ???????? ???????? ??????
wing parties. Of particular relevance is what political 
??????????? ????? ????????? ??? ??? ????? ?????????? ???????
of radical right-wing opposition parties on parties in 
power (Akkerman 2015; Norris 2005: 264-272: Van 
Spanje 2010). What “contagion” means in this context 
is that radical right-wing parties cause other parties to 
???????????????????? ???????? ????????????????????????????
Since radical right-wing parties usually advocate 
blocking the entry of immigrants and refugees, it 
???? ??????? ?? ?????????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????????
parties shift their policies to be more restrictive by 
tightening border controls and the criteria for asylum 
recognition. When, in fact, does the radical right 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
national elections. Having seen how well radical 
right-wing parties did in the last national elections, 
governing parties decide whether or not to make their 
immigration policy more restrictive. If the radical 
right wins a great many seats in the elections, the 
governing parties will consider that a strong public 
concern over immigration has led to the electoral 
success of the radical right. Originally, this contagion 
logic was studied with reference to the broad category 
of immigration. A similar logic might also be applied 
to refugee issues as well. So the electoral success of 
the anti-immigrant radical right might lead parties in 
power to become more restrictive towards the entry 
of refugees and also more reluctant to support a 
refugee-sharing scheme. From this reasoning, we can 
formulate the following hypothesis:
H1b: In states where radical right-wing parties 
win many seats in the last national elections, 
the governments are likely to oppose a refugee-
sharing scheme.
We can conceive, too, of a second possible pathway 
???? ?? ?????????? ??????? ????? ???????? ??? ?????
????????????? ????????? ??? ??? ??????????? ????? ???? ??????
comes into play only when right-wing governments 
are pitted against other right-wing opposition parties 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
2010: 567). On the one hand, leftist parties are 
??????????? ????? ???????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??????
of the radical right. This is partly because leftist 
governments generally feel it awkward to take a 
hardline approach to immigrants and refugees, owing 
to their traditionally pro-immigration stance, and 
partly also because there is usually little overlap in the 
electoral support base between the leftist and radical 
right-wing parties. On the other, rightist parties feel 
more vulnerable to the rise of the radical right, since 
right-wing parties usually compete with each other 
for conservative or nationalist votes. In view of their 
ideological closeness, when the radical right enjoys 
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popularity, center-right or moderate right-wing 
parties will consider shifting their policies to more 
restrictive ones vis-à-vis immigrants and refugees, in 
order to regain from the radical right-wing opposition 
the votes of people with conservative beliefs. Hence, 
the following hypothesis can be formulated:
H1c: In states where rightist parties are in 
government and radical right-wing parties are in 
opposition, the governments are likely to oppose 
a refugee-sharing scheme.
2.2. Institutional capacity
Historical institutionalism considers that institutions 
become increasingly stable over time by producing 
??????????????? ??? ????????????????? ??????? ??????????
Thelen & Longstreth 1992; Pierson 1996; Pierson & 
Skocpol 2002). In this theoretical view, the domestic 
institutions, which states have long been constructing, 
have a general tendency to allow at most for 
???????????? ??????? ???? ????????????? ??? ?? ????? ???
produce a systemic change in ways which depart 
????????????? ????? ???? ?????????????? ??????????????
practices.
Various mechanisms are thought to underlie this 
???????????? ?????? ??? ????????????? ?????? ?????? ???
44; Zürn 2016: 205-211). First, huge setup costs 
inhibit governments from switching to alternative 
?????????????? ?????? ????? ?????? ?????????????? ????? ????
current ones. Second, a large-scale reform is also 
?????????? ?????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????????? ????? ????
existing ones will oppose or veto it. Third, policy 
expertise and information are also a source of stability, 
since many actors involved in the current institutions, 
????? ??? ????????????? ??????????? ??????? ??? ???????
experts, have adjusted themselves to the existing 
systems by accumulating the practical know-how 
and information necessary to carry out the existing 
policies.
????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??????? ????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
own historical experiences and policy considerations. 
When governments consider whether to support or 
oppose a proposal for refugee-sharing, varying levels 
of institutional capacity across states carry more or 
less weight in their considerations. In order to accept a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
budget and infrastructure. They also need practical 
expertise to integrate recognized refugees into their 
societies and labor markets.
It is considered that the more a state has accepted 
refugees, the more it can expand their capacity with 
more resources, expertise and infrastructure. When 
called upon to accept refugees and asylum-seekers 
as part of a refugee-sharing scheme, those with 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
in their experience and capacity. Conversely, it will 
pose a great challenge to less-experienced states, 
since they are less prepared to receive them, knowing 
the shortage of accommodation, administrative 
??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
and concerns in mind, inexperienced countries will be 
reluctant to receive refugees and asylum-seekers in 
their territories. On the basis of this reasoning, we can 
formulate the following hypothesis:
H2: States with extensive experience and 
capacity in refugee protection are likely to 
support a refugee-sharing scheme.
2.3. Socio-ethnic composition
Building on the theoretical insights that have developed 
??? ???? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ???? ???????????
various studies have examined public attitudes to 
immigrants. To start with, those studies draw attention 
to the general propensity of people to distinguish 
individuals who belong to the same groups as theirs 
(ingroups) and those who belong to other groups 
(outgroups) (Sherif et al 1961). The ingroup/outgroup 
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perception, underlying which cognitive (Tajfel 1982) 
and/or evolutionary mechanisms (Kurzban & Leary 
2001; Park 2012) seem to be at work, develops biased 
attitudes, mostly favoring ingroup members and 
devaluating outgroup members.
Attitudes to immigration are associated with this 
kind of group demarcation along ethnic and religious 
lines (Fetzer 2012). Some members of majority groups 
have a negative attitude to immigrants. In Europe, for 
example, Muslim people are a common target of such 
anti-immigrant sentiments. But even in Europe, this 
kind of exclusive attitude is not always widespread 
in a society and the public attitude to immigrants can 
be volatile. When then are anti-immigrant attitudes 
widespread or dwindling in a society? In this respect, 
group threat theory predicts that most people will 
strengthen their anti-immigrant attitudes as the 
immigrant population expands (Quillan 1995). The 
underlying logic is that when the size of the immigrant 
group expands in relation to the majority group, 
the latter group increasingly perceives threats to its 
opportunities or resources, such as job opportunities 
and access to public services. Public attitudes can 
often bring pressure to bear on national governments. 
When faced with widespread public concern about the 
consequences of the growing immigrant population, 
national governments may respond by restricting 
immigration and for similar reasons, they may also 
limit access to asylum-seekers as well. The hypothesis 
deriving from this reasoning is the following:
H3a: When a country already has a large 
population with the same ethnic and religious 
background as that of refugees and asylum-
seekers, its government is likely to oppose a 
refugee-sharing scheme.
In contrast to this prediction of group threat theory, 
another theoretical view argues the opposite. The 
opposite view, most famously put forth by the “contact 
thesis” presented in social psychology (Allport 1954), 
considers that an increase in the immigrant population 
will lead most citizens of a nation to become tolerant 
and even friendly towards the immigrants. It is true 
that when states begin to accept large numbers of 
immigrants, some native people may react negatively. 
This thesis, however, argues that as the majority 
increasingly shares its social life with the immigrants, 
their initial aversive attitudes moderate and they 
eventually come to take a more positive stance. 
?????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ??? ???????? ???????????
governments can become willing to receive further 
immigrants. This theoretical logic was originally 
applied to the acceptance of immigrants, but the 
same logic may also apply to that of refugees. So the 
following hypothesis can also be envisaged:
H3b: When a country already has a large 
population with the same ethnic and religious 
background as that of refugees and asylum-
seekers, its government is likely to support a 
refugee-sharing scheme.
2.4. Labor market conditions
In economic terms, immigration on a large scale 
????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
countries (Orrenius & Zavodny 2012). As the number 
of immigrants increases, the public expenditure 
grows where education, medical care, and, when 
appropriate, pensions are concerned. But at the same 
time, immigrants can also contribute to their host 
countries by boosting the national workforce and 
contributing to tax revenue.
Most of the previous economic research, 
however, has shown that the macro-economic 
impact of immigrants is modest. Even so, one 
particular economic aspect may carry weight among 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
on the labor market. Various reports from think-tanks, 
newspaper articles and magazine columns suggest 
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????? ??????????? ???? ???? ??? ???? ????????? ??? ?????? ???
many developed countries (e.g. Peri 2014). When a 
country’s workforce declines and its population ages, 
??? ?????? ?? ???????? ??????? ??? ???????? ?????????????
and increasingly expensive medical and social care 
for the elderly. To cover the cost of its payments, 
governments need a strong and steady workforce. 
So, for fear lest the shortage of workers will hinder 
the balancing of the national budget and sustainable 
economic growth, states may look to immigrants and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
negative impacts. From this line of reasoning, the 
following hypothesis can be derived:
H4: States are likely to support a refugee-sharing 
scheme when they face a steady decline in the 
working age population.
2.5. Social norms
It is also worthwhile to take an alternative perspective 
provided by social constructivism or sociological 
institutionalism, which has secured an important 
position in the theoretical debates on international 
relations (Wendt 1999). Its distinctiveness lies in its 
theoretical assumption about the human motivation 
to act in a particular way. Constructivists consider 
that people act with reference to their normative and 
inter-subjective frameworks, guided by a collective 
understanding of what are commonly perceived as 
appropriate, legitimate or desirable acts in a given 
social environment (March & Olsen 1998: 309-312). 
One of the important implications of this assumption 
is that people will try to help others out, not because it 
is in their material interests, but because they consider 
doing so to be a moral imperative.
In the context of a refugee crisis, one such behavior 
is to save the lives of refugees (Thielemann 2003b). 
But when are states morally motivated to help refugees 
out? To help refugees is to respect and guarantee 
basic human rights, such as physical safety, minimum 
means of life (e.g. food and accommodation), the 
right to property, equality and non-discrimination. 
Therefore we can expect to see national support to a 
sharing scheme and refugees received in states where 
human rights as important values and norms are 
highly regarded. By contrast, reluctant attitudes will 
prevail in states where human rights protection is not 
so highly recognized as an important value:
H5: In states where people attach much value to 
the protection of human rights, the governments 
are likely to support a sharing scheme.
2.6. Security concerns
Since the 9/11 strikes and the ensuing wave of terrorist 
attacks in various regions, the linkage of security with 
transnational human mobility has gained particular 
prominence in political and academic debates around 
the world (Adamson 2006).
Terrorist groups, radicalized with fundamentalist 
beliefs or extreme political ambitions, do not, as a 
rule, have strong enough military forces to match 
those possessed by modern states. In such an 
asymmetrical power relationship, what they attempt 
to do is to challenge their target states by, for example, 
the indiscriminate suicide bombing of crowds in 
city streets and attacks on transportation systems 
(Koslowski 2012).
In relation to refugees and asylum-seekers, terrorists 
make use of trans-border mobility in two main ways 
(Leiken 2005). First, terrorists sometimes hide among 
refugees in order to enter a target state. Second, they 
also seek collaboration from refugees and immigrants, 
and solicit them to carry out terrorist acts. The 
terrorists get in touch with refugees or immigrants 
via their transnational networks, often using social 
networking services or Internet webpages. 
Seen in this light, it is clearly not the refugees 
or asylum seekers themselves who threaten state 
security. It is instead the activities of terrorist groups 
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??????????? ???? ???? ??? ??????????? ???? ????????? ????
their own ends that are perceived as a threat in this 
context.
To eliminate such a risk, national governments 
take various measures – enhancing their border 
controls, intelligence services and policing activities. 
Importantly, nations vary in the extent to which 
people feel vulnerable to the security threat posed by 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????? ????? ????? ?????????? ??? ??????
border control capacity and policing activities against 
terrorists are expected to be more prepared to accept 
refugees, thereby making the governments supportive 
of a refugee-sharing scheme. By contrast, when 
they are less confident in their country’s security 
measures, they will be less willing to support such a 
scheme. Based on such reasoning we can formulate 
the following hypothesis:
H6: In states where the hosting of refugees is not 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
public order, governments are likely to support a 
refugee-sharing scheme.
So far, we have formulated a wide range of hypotheses 
that may plausibly explain the positions of national 
governments on the sharing of refugees. While these 
hypotheses, taken together, cover a wide range of 
????????? ???????? ??????????? ????????????? ???????????
one may consider that there are other possible factors, 
presumably, public attitudes to the EU, the general 
economic conditions, geographical factors, or the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
In our empirical analysis below, for a robustness 
check, we test these possible factors as well.
3. The EU’s two decisions to share asylum-seekers 
in 2015
During the 2000s, a great many of the refugees who 
arrived in Europe originated from Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Eritrea and Yemen. But the situation became far worse, 
in the 2010s when a wave of pro-democratization 
movements called “the Arab Spring” surged over the 
Middle East and North Africa. In some countries, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
one that erupted in Syria has particularly escalated, 
causing an immense number of casualties, internally 
displaced persons and refugees. The refugees from 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
highest number going to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. 
The number of those who crossed the Mediterranean 
to a European country has also sharply increased. 
???? ?????????? ??????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ????????
who reached Europe was around 431,000 in 2013 and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to around 1.25 million in 2015.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
European Commission presented a document called 
a “European Agenda on Migration” which set out a 
series of emergency measures, intended both to help 
asylum-seekers and to spread among the member 
states the heavy burden of asylum-seekers that had 
fallen on a few of them. As part of it, the EU member 
states adopted two decisions in September 2015 
which laid out a temporal relocation scheme. The 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
relocating 40,000 asylum-seekers from Greece 
and Italy to other member states.1 The second one, 
adopted on 22 September, envisaged the relocation 
of a further 120,000 asylum-seekers from Greece 
and Italy.2 In putting forward these two decisions, 
the Commission calculated how many refugees and 
asylum-seekers each member state should receive 
1 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523, OJL239, 15/9/2015, pp.146-156. 
2 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, OJL248, 24/9/2015, pp.80-94.
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according to a combination of several criteria: the size 
of each state’s population, GDP, the average number 
of asylum applicants in the last four years, and the 
unemployment rate.
The debates on the relocation scheme sparked 
great controversy among states. With regard to the 
????? ?????????? ???? ??????? ??????? ???????? ??? ??????
consensus, but when the negotiations moved on to 
the second proposal, several states were vehemently 
opposed to it, thereby making it impossible to reach 
consensus. To resolve the deadlock, the states that 
?????????? ???? ?????????????? ??????????? ?? ?????????
majority vote, under the TFEU78 (3), deviating from 
the Council’s general practice of settling negotiations 
by consensus.
The vote revealed the various positions taken by the 
member states: eighteen states approved, one opted in 
(Ireland), one abstained (Finland), four disapproved 
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia), and two opted out (Denmark and the UK). 
Initially Poland and Latvia also expressed reluctance 
but in the end they chose to vote for the proposal. In 
this decision, Hungary, which was one of the strongly 
????????????????????????? ???????????????? ??? ?????????
those who arrived there. Even after the decision was 
adopted, their opposition continued. In an attempt to 
annul the decision, Hungary and Slovakia brought this 
issue before the Court of Justice, which eventually 
dismissed the claims of these countries.
The two relocation decisions foresaw the 
completion of the relocation within two years. But 
before long, it became clear that the relocation scheme 
could not be implemented as originally planned. As of 
January 2018, only 33,365 asylum-seekers have been 
relocated (21,711 from Greece and 11,654 from Italy), 
which is far below the originally scheduled number 
of 160,000. In this situation, the Commission and 
the European Parliament warned the member states 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
relocation scheme, and in June 2017, the Commission 
started infringement procedures against Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, which continued to 
refuse their committing to the scheme.
In this way, the relocation decisions exposed the 
????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ???
did some states support the EU’s refugee-sharing 
scheme and why did the others oppose it? This is the 
question that we analyze in the next section.
4. Research design
Here we provide information on the ways that we 
operationalized our dependent variables, independent 
variables, our statistical research methods, and the set 
of data on which we relied for our empirical analysis. 
4.1. Dependent variables
Our empirical focus was on the second relocation 
decision of the EU. Our dependent variables were the 
national positions taken by each member state vis-à-
vis the Commission’s proposal for refugee relocation. 
We coded “1” for the governments which voted 
“yes” or decided to “opt in” (Ireland) to the refugee-
sharing proposal and “0” for all the others, that is, 
the governments which voted against, abstained 
Table 1: National positions on the relocation scheme proposed by the Commission
Positions Member states
Yes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta,  the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
Opt-in Ireland
Abstention Finland
Opt-out Denmark, the United Kingdom
No The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania
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or remained “opted-out”. We considered this way 
of coding the most straightforward. However, two 
??????????? ?????????? ???? ????? ??? ??????? ?????? ???
Poland and Latvia. While they decided to vote for the 
proposal, they had publicly expressed their reluctance 
during the negotiations. Hence, the following 
analysis adds another model that switches these two 
cases (from “0” to “1”) as a robustness check of our 
empirical analysis.
We use a logistic regression model, with a robust 
standard error. Models 1 and 2 use the same dependent 
variable, but Model 2 includes the interaction term 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the left-right positioning of the government to test 
H1c. Model 3 uses an alternative dependent variable, 
that reverses Poland and Latvia’s position for a further 
robustness check.
4.2. Independent variables
To empirically test the hypotheses as formulated 
above, we relied upon various types of information 
relevant to our hypotheses.
First, in operationalizing the positions of political 
parties on the ideological left-right dimension 
(H1a,b,c), we used Döring and Manow’s Parliament 
and Government (ParlGov) database (Döring & 
Manow 2016).3 Summing up the left-right scaling of 
each political party in a government coalition at the 
time of September 2015 after weighing each party’s 
importance on the basis of its share of seats, we made 
each government’s left-right scaling (from -5, farthest 
left, to 5, farthest right).4????????????????????????????????
parties”, we used ParlGov data. If a given party was 
??????? ??? ????????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???? ????? ??
party was in opposition in September 2015, its share 
of seats in parliament was coded as a seat share of the 
right-wing opposition (from 0 to 100).
Second, to measure the institutional capacity of 
each state, we used the number of refugees per national 
population, calculated by each country’s number of 
refugees residing in the country divided by its total 
population. In this regard, we used the number before 
the start of the “Arab Spring”, since the number, 
?????? ???? ?????? ?? ??????????? ????????? ?????? ??????
is the very aspect of the problem that we address in 
our analysis. We thus chose to use the UNHCR’s data 
of 2010 for the number of refugees residing in each 
country (UNHCR 2010), and the Eurostat data for the 
total national population in the same year (Eurostat 
2016b). We took the number of refugees per national 
population as a proxy for the level of development 
of domestic capacity for accepting refugees. The 
reasoning behind this was that the more a country 
has accepted refugees in proportion to the size of 
its population, the more the country is considered to 
have developed the domestic institutional capacity to 
accept refugees.
Third, the socio-ethnic composition was 
operationalized by the ratio of the Muslim population 
in each country’s population, drawing on data from 
the Pew Research Center (2011). The use of a Muslim 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
many refugees and asylum-seekers entering EU states 
are Muslim or at least come from Islamic countries. 
Fourth, the extent to which a country’s labor force 
is increasing or declining was captured by looking 
at each country’s ratio changes in the working age 
population (15-64 years old) in relation to the total 
population between 2004 and 2014. Here we relied on 
the Eurostat data (Eurostat 2016a).
Fifth, in order to represent the level of each country’s 
respect for the normative values of helping refugees, 
3 ParlGov database [http://www.parlgov.org/] (Döring and Manow, 2016).
4? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
included on this scale, because intermediate numbers do not include 0. Hence we replaced the range of numbers “from 0 to 10” by “from 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS) — Vol.1
84
we drew on a question asked in a special edition of the 
Eurobarometer: Europeans in 2014: “In the following 
list, which are the most important values for you 
personally” (European Commission 2014: 124). This 
question allowed multiple answers, and we used the 
percentage of respondents in each state who answered 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the level of security concerns in each state by using 
a question asked in another Special Eurobarometer: 
Europeans’ Attitudes towards Security (European 
Commission 2015: 25). The question was “In your 
opinion, how important are the following challenges 
to the internal security of the EU?” Again, multiple 
????????????? ??????? ??? ??????????????????????????
the percentage of respondents in each country who 
answered that the “management of the EU’s external 
borders” was “very important”.
5. Empirical analysis
Table 2 demonstrates the results, with the following 
????????
5.1. Party politics (H1a,b,c)
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ???????????? ???? ?????????????? ????????????? ??? ????
models. We got the same results in our preliminary 
analysis by controlling for the other parameters. 
Hence, we can say that the left-right scaling of a 
government alone is not relevant to its position 
(H1a). However, the analysis shows that under some 
??????????? ???? ????????????? ??? ?????????? ????????
matter and it reveals that the seat share of right-wing 
opposition parties has a negative and statistically 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
This result is seen to be consistent with H1b. The odds 
ratio of this factor in Model 1 is estimated at 0.77 
times, in the case of an increase of 1 point (1 percent) 
in the share of seats for right-wing opposition parties 
in parliament. Therefore, if the right-wing opposition 
has 10% of seats in parliament in a given country, the 
probability of voting “yes” to a refugee scheme would 
decline to 7.3% (0.7710), compared to a country (with 
the same conditions in other parameters) without 
Table 2: Multivariate logistic regression on the EU states’ positions on the refugee-sharing scheme
MODEL
(1) (2) (3)
PL&LV=0
Cabinet right-left scale (H1a) -.190(.316)
.263
(.385)
-.251
(.386)
Seat share of right wing opposition (H1b) -.256
**
(.121)
.352
(.263)
.299
(.255)
Cabinet right-left scale *
Seat share of right wing proportion (H1c)
-.308**
(.130)
-.270**
(.116)
Refugees per population (H2) .306(.197)
.386*
(.233)
.420**
(.204)
The ratio of Muslim population (H3ab) .938(.732)
.689*
(.397)
.820**
(.363)
Labour force decline (H4) .231(.480)
.440
(.593)
.301
(.497)
Human rights norm (H5) .023(.127)
.015
(.101)
-.088
(.093)
Security concern (H6) -.275(.242)
-.282
(.249)
-.243
(.192)
Constant 10.513(11.707)
11.200
(11.701)
13.018
(9.250)
Pseudo R2 .472 .554 .581
N 28 28 28
Estimation with Robust Standard Error  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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???? ??????????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ?????? ??????
??? ????? ???????????? ???????????? ??? ??????? ?? ???? ???
????? ????????? ????????? ???? ???????????? ????? ????????
Technically speaking, these results in Models 2 or 3 
tell us only that the share of seats for the right-wing 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
only if the government left-right scaling takes the 
score “0.”
The interaction term between a government’s left-
right scaling and the share of seats for its right-wing 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ????? ??????? ???????? ????? ???? ??????????? ?????
?????? ???????? ???? ?? ???????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ????
proportion of seats won by the far-right opposition in 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(taking the score of “1” in our dependent variable) will 
become more negative in cases where the proportion 
of seats won by right-wing parties is high. Figure 1 
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
also becomes more negative when the government 
position is farther to the right and less when the 
government position is more moderate (Figure 2). 
These results are consistent with our H1c.
These results indicate that in the states where 
governments were right-inclined and at the same time 
right wing opposition won seats, the governments 
??????? ?????????? ?????????????????????????????????
examples, the UK’s Conservative cabinet with 
UKIP in opposition, Hungary’s Fidesz cabinet with 
the far-right opposition of Jobbik, and Denmark’s 
center-right Liberal Party cabinet facing the powerful 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
these conditions, and none of these governments 
supported the scheme. In contrast, Estonia, where the 
government was rightist but there were no right-wing 
opposition parties, and Sweden, where far-rightist 
opposition won many seats but the government was 
leftist, supported the scheme.
5.2. Institutional capacity (H2)
The governments which traditionally have accepted a 
large number of refugees must have a relatively high 
number of refugee inhabitants. In our analysis, this 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
government decision to share the burden of refugees 
(see Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 2). It was shown 
that states which have already accepted a large number 
of refugees tended to support the scheme more than 
those with limited experience of doing so.
5.3. The socio-ethnic composition (H3a,b)
The Muslim population ratio in each state, presented 
in Models 2 and 3, have a positive and statistically 
??????????? ?????? ??? ????????????? ???????? ??? ???
opposition to refugee-sharing. Consistent with the 
prediction of H3b, and opposed to that of H3a, the 
odds ratio of accepting the sharing scheme is 1.99 (see 
Model 2). This means that only a one percentage point 
increase of Muslim residents in a given country makes 
the probability of the country’s accepting the scheme 
??????? ?????? ??? ??????? ????? ?????? ??? ????? ???????5 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
economic inequality (see Appendix). Some previous 
research suggests that the interaction between ethnic 
heterogeneity and economic inequality may increase 
exclusionary attitudes to ethnic minority groups and 
?????? ?????? ??????? ????????? ?????? ????????? ??? ???
2014), but this was not the case in our analysis.
???????????????????? ????? ???????????????????????
population ratio emerges because of a spurious 
relationship caused by past government policies 
of accepting refugees. However, we checked this 
possibility and no statistical correlation was found 
between the Muslim population ratio and the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
independently investigated in our model, as shown 
below.
Comparing Bulgaria and Romania seems to be 
fruitful in this regard. They have much in common: 
5? ????? ???????????? ??? ????? ????????? ?????? ???? ??????? ??? ????????? ???????????????????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????? ????????????
variables (including the proportion of immigrants or ethnolinguistic fractionalization) did not provide such a result (see Appendix).
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both are southeastern European countries which 
joined the EU in 2007; their economic situations were 
similar; and both remain outside of the Schengen area. 
But Bulgaria supported the sharing scheme whereas 
Romania opposed it. Based on our analysis, the 
?????????? ??????? ????????????? ?????????????? ??? ????
population ratio of the Muslim minority; the Muslim 
population accounts for 13.7% in Bulgaria and only 
0.3% in Romania.
5.4. Labor market conditions (H4)
The estimates for the decline in labor force were 
?????? ??? ??? ?????????????? ?????????????? ???? ?????????
rejected Hypothesis 4. Our preliminary analysis also 
found that the alternative measures of the economic 
situation, such as the unemployment rate, also had 
??? ??????????? ??????? ?????? ????????????? ????? ???????
to prove their explanatory power with regard to the 
refugee-sharing scheme.
For example, on the one hand, Portugal and 
Cyprus, each with an increasing labor force and high 
unemployment rate, accepted the refugee relocation 
plan. This contradicted the theoretical predictions that 
these countries would refuse to accept new refugees 
as a labor force. The Czech Republic, on the other 
hand, had experienced the most severe decline in the 
labor force in Europe, along with one of its lowest 
unemployment rates. Theoretically, this nation should 
have accepted newly relocated refugees as a latent 
labor force. However, it voted against the refugee-
sharing scheme (Figure 3).
5.5. Social norms (H5)
People’s normative consciousness, represented by 
the proportion of people who think that human 
rights is “the most important value”, does not have 
?? ?????????????? ??????????? ????????????? ????? ??????
government’s attitude to the refugee-sharing scheme. 
It seems that the governments of the member states 
decided whether to support or oppose the EU scheme 
irrespective of the levels of norm strength concerning 
the respect of human rights among the general public. 
 
?: Against the EU scheme ?: Support for the EU scheme   
Figure 3. Economic situations and support/opposition to the refugee-sharing scheme
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5.6. Security concern (H6)
Security concerns, operationalized by the saliency 
??? ???? ??????? ??????? ???????????? ?? ????????? ??????
??? ?????? ?? ??????????? ????? ??? ?? ???? ????????????
standard) but the other two models do not present 
???????????? ????????????? ?????? ????? ???????? ??? ?????
??????????????????????? ?? ??? ????????????????????????
on the decisions of the member states regarding the 
sharing scheme.
For a further robustness check of our analysis, we 
????? ???????? ??? ??????????? ????? ???????? ?? ???????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of Euroscepticism on government decisions, with the 
data of the proportion of respondents that does “not 
tend to trust” the European Commission, according to 
?????????????????????? ????????????????? ??????????????
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
of Euroscepticism among the general public did not 
matter. We also conducted another analysis with the 
cases of Italy, Greece, and Malta omitted from our 
analysis sampling. We omitted Italy and Greece, 
because the EU’s refugee-sharing scheme would 
relocate asylum-seekers who had arrived in these two 
countries. We also omitted Malta since the EU, as a 
pilot program, has recently relocated asylum-seekers 
from this country to other states. This analysis did 
???????????????????????????? ??????? ??????????????????
shown above (see Appendix, Model 5). So we can say 
that the results of our analysis are stable and robust.
Conclusion: A glimpse of hope for
solidarity
In this article, we have attempted to uncover the 
factors underlying the variations in national position, 
by focusing on the refugee-sharing scheme set in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
supported the scheme. First, national governments 
supported the scheme unless a rightist party (or more 
than one) was in power and at the same time other 
right-wing parties — most commonly, radical right-
wing parties — were in opposition. Having similar 
ideological and policy preferences, the center-right 
government and radical right-wing opposition 
???? ????? ??? ??? ?????????? ???????? ????? ????? ??????
for conservative or nationalist votes. In these 
circumstances, it is found, the radical right-wing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
drive the center-right government to shift its position 
so as to reject the scheme.
Second, it is also shown that governments were 
willing to support the scheme when they had a wealth 
of experience in refugee protection. In this respect, 
we can see a positive feedback loop which can 
increasingly make states willing to accept refugees. 
This mechanism is that the experience leads to 
capacity building in the area of refugee protection, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
accept further refugees.
?????? ???? ???????? ???? ????????? ????? ???????? ?????
many states which in fact supported the scheme 
were those which had a large Muslim population 
compared to the total national population. This 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
have already settled, people are used to sharing their 
life with those Muslims and as a result feel less 
resistant to the prospect of new Muslim refugees 
entering their society. The governments’ support to 
???? ??????? ???? ??? ????? ??? ?????????? ????? ?????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
also suggests that in states with a lower Muslim 
population, people are not accustomed to interacting 
with Muslims and do not feel they can easily accept 
Muslim refugees in their societies, thereby leading 
their governments to be less supportive of the scheme.
Out of the three hypotheses found relevant in this 
?????????? ???? ??? ???? ??????????? ???????? ??? ????????
protection (H3: Institutional capacity), while the other 
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two (H1: party competition and H4: socio-ethnic 
composition) are derived from the insights which have 
been developed in the studies focusing on a broad 
????????? ??? ?????????????? ???????? ???????????????
voluntary, often economic, migrants from refugees or 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of origin. In the literature, it has generally been less 
clear whether the two hypotheses drawn from studies 
of migration are also relevant to the shaping of 
national positions vis-à-vis a refugee-sharing scheme. 
Our analysis found that the contagion thesis and the 
contact thesis have broader applicability to refugee 
protection.
There are some limitations to this study. First, 
more cases and samples are needed,  to better 
??????????? ???? ????? ????? ?????????? ????????????
about the variation in national positions vis-à-vis the 
relocation of refugees. We have analyzed only one 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
samples. Future research would do well to expand 
our analytical coverage to other attempts made to 
construct a relocation scheme. Second, what we have 
empirically examined was the EU decision that was 
adopted in September 2015. An important point is 
that the decision was adopted shortly after a shocking 
photo was spread across the world, showing a three-
year old Syrian boy who was drowned on his journey 
across the Mediterranean to Europe. The timing of 
the decision should be kept in mind, since the photo 
is thought to have been a powerful inducement to 
governments to support the relocation scheme. We 
should examine whether national governments can 
be persuaded to accept refugees even without such a 
facilitating factor.
Given these limitations, and given also our 
????????? ???? ??? ???? ????????? ?? ???????????? ????
practically important question: whether states can 
??????? ??????????? ??? ????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???
as many refugees as possible. Admittedly, those who 
would propose a refugee-sharing scheme have some 
reasons to be pessimistic. We are currently witnessing 
the spread of support for radical right-wing wing 
parties in European countries. There are rightist 
parties which have lately picked up the reins of 
government in Europe. These two phenomena, taken 
together, simply increase the likelihood, in terms of 
???? ????????????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ?????? ????? ????
center-right parties which are in power will, faced 
with radical right-wing parties in opposition, thereby 
oppose refugee-sharing as a move in their inter-
party competition. Second, it may not be desirable to 
impose a mandatory quota of refugees on states with 
less experience and capacity in refugee protection, 
because rather it often provokes resistance of those 
states. Third, since there is little likelihood that the 
Muslim population ratio will change drastically in the 
short run, we see few chances for some time that states 
with a smaller Muslim population will change their 
position in favor of supporting a plan for relocating 
refugees and accepting more.
Nonetheless, from the longer-term perspective, we 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
?????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ???????
member states, as many as twenty countries voted 
for the sharing scheme, while only four states voted 
against it. Our analysis suggests that there are three 
main factors behind their reluctance or opposition: 
the rivalry between rightist parties, limited experience 
and capacity in refugee protection, and a lower 
Muslim population. These three are not rigidly static 
factors; they can change. First, with regard to party 
politics, it is rather rare for the two conditions (a right-
wing government and radical right-wing opposition) 
to coexist. This means that when one left-wing party 
or more joins a government, as happens more often, 
the latter is less likely to oppose the idea of relocating 
refugees, even if its coalition contains rightist parties. 
Furthermore, it is also suggested that governments are 
least likely to oppose this idea when radical right-wing 
parties are absent from parliament. Second, we can 
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consider that institutional capacity can be expanded in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
capacity at present, they may feel less resistant to 
increasing, little by little, the number of refugees 
they accept, and in this way build up their capacity 
gradually. As they increasingly have experience of 
accepting refugees and correspondingly strengthen 
their institutional capacity, they may be expected to 
become more willing to accept yet more refugees 
and to support a proposal for refugee-sharing. Third, 
there is in the long run a tendency for the Muslim 
population in many countries to gradually or steadily 
increase, including those countries which have a small 
Muslim population at present. In several decades, 
more Muslims will be living in these countries and 
will interact with the local people. This tendency 
provides us with a future prospect that more European 
countries may be more willing to receive refugees 
and asylum-seekers coming from Islamic countries. 
All things considered, in the long run, we should not 
despair over the prospects for refugee-sharing.
Appendix
Results of Robustness Checks
MODEL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IT, EL, MT 
ommited
Cabinet right-left scale .023
(.381)
.133
(.408)
.446
(.721)
.463
(.427)
.484
(.460)
Seat share of right wing opposition .567
(.408)
.625*
(.326)
 241
(.221)
.420
(.318)
.020
(.144)
Cabinet right-left scale *
Seat share of right wing proportion
-.289*
(.163)
-.321**
(.133)
- 245**
(.116)
-.405*
(.212)
-.169**
(.070)
Refugees per population .167
(.138)
.447**
(.218)
1.094*
(.620)
.313
( 221)
-.164
(.265)
The ratio of migrant population .250
(.183)
Ethnolanguage Fractionalization -.106
(.076)
The ratio of Muslim population (centralized) .443**
(.218)
.846
(.562)
.700**
(.306)
Gini Index [centralized] 1.123**
(.442)
The ratio of Muslim population *
Gini Index
.080
(.080)
Labour force decline .517
(.635)
.356
(.457)
-.505
(.388)
.437
(.596)
.433
(.612)
Human rights norm .160
(.156)
.406
(.132)
-.239**
(.118)
-.096
(.131)
-.013
(.098)
Security concern -.066
(.099)
-.103
(.093)
-.595*
(.308)
-.354
(.303)
-.236
(.184)
Euroscepticism -.077
(.060)
Constant -4.560
(8.735)
9.985
(11.056)
35.829**
(15.666)
25.371
(20.250)
10.817
(9.406)
Pseudo R2 .396 .387 .705 .581 .549
N 28 28 28 28 25
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